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Abstract- Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANET) have been highly vulnerable to attacks due to the dynamic nature of its
network infrastructure. Among these attacks, routing attacks have received considerable attention since it could cause the
most devastating damage to MANET. Even though there exist several intrusion response techniques to mitigate such critical
attacks, existing solutions typically attempt to isolate malicious nodes based on binary or naı¨ve fuzzy response decisions.
However, binary responses may result in the unexpected network partition, causing additional damages to the network
infrastructure, and naı¨ve fuzzy responses could lead to uncertainty in countering routing attacks in MANET. In this paper,
we propose a risk-aware response mechanism to systematically cope with the identified routing attacks. Our risk-aware
approach is based on an extended Dempster-Shafer mathematical theory of evidence introducing a notion of importance
factors. In addition, our experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach with the consideration of several
performance metrics

As shown in Fig. 1, the intrusion distance is referred
as D and defined as the distance between the points
the intruder enters the WSN, and the point the
intruder is detected by the WSN system. This
distance is of central interest to a WSN used for
intrusion detection. In this paper, we derive the
expected intrusion distance and evaluate the detection
probability in different application scenarios.. For
example, given an expected detection distance EðDÞ,
we can derive the node density with respect to
sensors’ sensing range, thereby knowing the total
number of sensors required for WSN deployment.

I. INTRODUCTION
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a collection of
spatially deployed wireless sensors by which to
monitor various changes of environmental conditions
(e.g., forest fire, air pollutant concentration, and
object moving) in a collaborative manner without
relying on any underlying infrastructure support
.Recently, a number of research efforts have been
made to develop sensor hardware and network
architectures in order to effectively deploy WSNs for
a variety of applications. Due to a wide diversity of
WSN application requirements, however, a generalpurpose WSN design cannot fulfill the needs of all
applications. Many network parameters such as
sensing range, transmission range, and node density
have to be carefully considered at the network design
stage, according to specific applications. To achieve
this, it is critical to capture the impacts of network
parameters on network performance with respect to
application specifications. Intrusion detection (i.e.,
object tracking) in a WSN can be regarded as a
monitoring system for detecting the intruder that is
invading the network domain.

In a WSN, there are two ways to detect an object (i.e.,
an intruder): single-sensing detection and multiplesensing detection. In the single-sensing detection, the
intruder can be successfully detected by a single
sensor. On the contrary, in the multiple-sensing
detection, the intruder can only be detected by
multiple collaborating sensors .In some applications,
the sensed information provided by a single sensor
might be inadequate for recognizing the intruder. It is
because individual sensors can only sense a portion of
the intruder. For example, the location of an intruder
can only be determined from at least three sensors’
sensing.

The intrusion detection application concerns how fast
the intruder can be detected by the WSN. If sensors
are deployed with a high density so that the union of
all sensing ranges covers the entire network area, the
intruder can be immediately detected once it
approaches the network area. However, such a highdensity deployment policy increases the network
investment and may be even unaffordable for a large
area. In fact, it is not necessary to deploy so many
sensors to cover the entire WSN area in many
applications, since a network with small and scattered
void areas will also be able to detect a moving
intruder within a certain intrusion distance. In this
case, the application can specify a required intrusion
distance within which the intruder should be detected.

In view of this, we analyze the intrusion detection
problem under two application scenarios: singlesensing detection and multiple-sensing detection.
According to the capability of sensors, we consider
two network types: homogeneous and heterogeneous
WSNs We define the sensor capability in terms of the
sensing range and the transmission range. In a
heterogeneousWSN some sensors have a larger
sensing range and more power to achieve a longer
transmission range. In this paper, we show that the
heterogeneous WSN increases the detection
probability for a given intrusion detection distance.
This motivates us to analyze the network connectivity
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adopted to support more adaptive responses to
routing attacks in MANET. Subjective knowledge
could be retrieved from previous experience and
objective evidence could be obtained from
observation while logical reasoning requires a formal
foundation. Wang et al. proposed a naı¨ve fuzzy costsensitive intrusion response solution for MANET.
Their cost model took subjective knowledge and
objective evidence into account but omitted a
seamless combination of two properties with logical
reasoning.

in this paper. Furthermore, in a heterogeneous WSN,
high capability sensors usually undertake more
important tasks (i.e., broadcasting power management
information or synchronization information to all the
sensors in the network),it is also desirable to define
and examine the broadcast reachability from highcapability sensors. The network connectivity and
broadcast reachability are important conditions to
ensure the detection probability in WSNs. They are
formally defined and analyzed in this paper. To the
best of our knowledge, our effect is the first to
address this issue in a heterogeneous WSN.

Proposed System:
We formally propose an extended D-S evidence
model with importance factors and articulate
expected properties for Dempster’s rule of
combination with importance factors (DRCIF). Our
Dempster’s rule of combination with importance
factors is nonassociative and weighted, which has not
been addressed in the literature.

We present an example scenario where _nding a route
with speci_c security attributes or trust levels is more
relevant than _nding the shortest route (or any route)
between two nodes. We focus on a high-risk ad hoc
network; wireless communication devices in a
battle_eld, where malicious adversaries can intercept
and alter mission critical information.

We propose an adaptive risk-aware response
mechanism with the extended D-S evidence model,
considering damages caused by both attacks and
countermeasures. The adaptiveness of our mechanism
allows us to systematically cope with MANET
routing attacks.

In Figure 1, two generals establish a route to
communicate among themselves, using a generic ondemand ad-hoc routing protocol. During the mission,
the generals detect that some of the privates have
defected. The generals decide that they can only trust
nodes owned by oÆcers to route their packets.
Relaying these messages using potentially
compromised nodes can leak information to untrusted
entities and jeopardize the mission. Even if the
generals encrypt the

We evaluate our response mechanism against
representative attack scenarios and experiments. Our
results clearly demonstrate the effectiveness and
scalability of our risk-aware approach.
Modules:
¾ Evidence collection
¾ Risk assessment
¾ Decision making
¾ Intrusion response
¾ Routing table recovery
1) Evidence collection
In this step, Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
gives an attack alert with a confidence value,
and then Routing Table Change Detector
(RTCD) runs to figure out how many changes
on routing table are caused by the attack.

Figure 1: Security-aware Routing - Motivation

2) Risk assessment
Alert confidence from IDS and the routing
table changing information would be further
considered as independent evidences for risk
calculation and combined with the extended DS theory. Risk of countermeasures is
calculated as well during a risk assessment
phase. Based on the risk of attacks and the risk
of countermeasures, the entire risk of an attack
could be figured out.
3) Decision making
The adaptive decision module provides a
flexible response decision-making mechanism,

Existing System:
Several work addressed the intrusion response actions
in MANET by isolating uncooperative nodes based
on the node reputation derived from their behaviors.
Such a simple response against malicious nodes often
neglects possible negative side effects involved with
the response actions. In MANET scenario, improper
countermeasures may cause the unexpected network
partition, bringing additional damages to the network
infrastructure. To address the above-mentioned
critical issues, more flexible and adaptive response
should be investigated. The notion of risk can be
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seek more systematic way to accommodate node
reputation and attack frequency in our adaptive
decision model.

which takes risk estimation and risk tolerance
into account. To adjust temporary isolation
level, a user can set different thresholds to
fulfill her goal.
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